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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a number of “scandals” have come to light in the 
financial services industry around the world that have caused significant 
harm to consumers and have cost the financial services industry 
considerable sums, in terms of fines, redress, and legal costs. It has been 
estimated, for example, that since the financial crisis in 2007, financial 
services firms have paid aggregate fines in excess of $320 billion 
worldwide in connection with employee misconduct.1 
More significantly, the “scandals” and failures of governance in 
financial services firms have damaged trust in the financial services 
industry. For example, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, 
has stated that “the incidence of financial sector misconduct has risen to a 
level that has the potential to create systemic risks by undermining trust in 
both financial institutions and markets.”2 
As noted by the Dutch regulator, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), 
“Trust is the foundation on which our financial system is built.”3 If the 
financial services industry is not trusted, customers may choose to engage 
less by investing less in their pensions, saving less, or purchasing fewer 
financial services products. This, in turn, “damage[s] both the industry and 
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the economy, by reducing the availability of capital for productive 
purposes.”4 
Also, the U.K. Banking Standards Board, the U.K. financial services 
industry-funded body set up in 2015 that aims to promote high standards 
of behavior and competence in the industry, recently stated: 
A successful, dynamic UK economy needs a strong, stable banking 
sector that serves the best interests of its customers. For the sector to 
contribute fully to the economy and society it needs to be trusted; not 
only by its customers (in the UK and globally), but also by its staff, 
by potential employees, by regulators and by policy makers. Trust in 
the sector has been damaged, and it is only the industry itself – by 
demonstrating honesty, reliability and competence on a consistent 
and collective basis – that can rebuild it.5 
The introduction of increasingly onerous legal and regulatory 
requirements on financial services firms, backed up by more intrusive 
supervision by regulators and the imposition of more significant sanctions 
on firms and individuals who have breached legal requirements, has led to 
improvements in the industry in recent years. It is generally recognized, 
however, that these developments, by themselves, do not sufficiently 
address the industry problems, given that the misconduct that has arisen 
appears to be symptomatic of a wider problem of “culture” in the financial 
services industry that needs to be addressed. 
As to the “cultural nature” of the problem, the then-Deputy Director 
of the Bank of England, Minouche Shafik, described the problem as one 
of “ethical drift” in the financial services industry; that “[c]learly it was 
not the case of a few bad apples, but something was rotten in the entire 
barrel.”6 Also, John Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the New York Federal Reserve, stated in a June 2018 speech that 
“underlying these scandals is often an inadequate corporate culture, where 
accountability and ethical conduct have fallen by the wayside.”7 
To address this cultural problem, regulators around the world have 
increasingly focused their supervisory attention and resources on firms’ 
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cultures in order to seek to preemptively address root causes of misconduct 
risks. The Dutch regulator, De Nederlandsche Bank, for example, has 
adopted a groundbreaking approach to supervising the behavior and 
culture of firms (as described in its textbook, Supervision of Behaviour 
and Culture: Foundations, Practice and Future Developments).8 Also, the 
New York Federal Reserve (Fed)9 and U.K. Financial Conduct Authority 
have focused efforts on culture reform in the industry. 
It is very clear, however, that for regulators it is primarily for firms 
rather than legislators or regulators to improve culture in firms: “[C]ultural 
problems are the industry’s responsibility to solve. The official sector can 
monitor progress and deliver feedback and recommendations. In fact, 
many individual supervisory findings are often symptoms of deeper 
cultural issues at a firm. But the banks themselves must actively reform 
and manage their cultures.”10 So, who is responsible within a firm for 
improving its culture, and what can they do about improving culture in 
their firm? 
Regulators have typically focused their supervisory efforts, in 
relation to culture, on the senior executive management rather than the 
board,11 as they are considered to be the key influencers of a firm’s 
culture.12 
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Boards do, nevertheless, have clear legal responsibilities regarding 
the culture of their firms. The 2015 Basel Corporate Governance 
Principles for Banks, for example, provide as Principle 1 that “[t]he board 
has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing 
management’s implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives, 
governance framework and corporate culture.” 13 At the European Union 
(EU) level, these principles are reflected in the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) Guidelines on Internal Governance.14 The question then 
becomes, what role can and should the board of a financial services firm 
play in improving the culture of the firm? A difficulty is that, as noted in 
a November 2018 G30 report, Banking Conduct and Culture: A 
Permanent Mindset Change, “[T]here is still a lack of clarity in many 
organizations on how the board will champion, oversee, and monitor 
conduct and culture issues . . . . ”15 
In this Article, we look at the role the board is expected to play under 
regulatory requirements and guidance; we then look specifically at the 
failings of boards in a number of the recent “scandals.” Finally, we offer a 
number of suggestions on ways in which the board can have a more 
effective role in improving firms’ culture. In this latter regard, we 
specifically focus on industry (rather than firm-specific) initiatives that 
could enable the board to have a more effective role, particularly in light 
of the setting up of the industry-funded Banking Standards Board in the 
U.K. and the recent setting up of the industry-funded Irish Banking Culture 
Board.16 
As to the particular areas where an industry-based approach, looking 
specifically at the role of boards, could assist the improvement of the 
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culture of financial services firms—and, thereby, potentially in due course, 
the trustworthiness of firms—we discuss in this Article below the 
following: 
In the first place, the board needs to ensure that it is properly 
informed—including on the basis of sufficiently reliable information from 
staff and customers—of potential issues of behaviors that diverge 
materially from espoused values. As is clear from the recent “scandals” 
discussed further below, in many cases, boards often fail to ensure they 
are properly informed of these issues, which provide an early warning 
signal of misconduct risk. The development of industry norms and 
possible benchmarking in relation to this failure to stay informed could be 
useful in assisting this process. In this regard, one of the potential areas of 
focus could usefully be in relation to customer complaints. 
Secondly, constructive challenges at the board level could be 
enhanced through the development of industry norms and peer review of 
board engagement. Such an approach could benefit from the approach to 
such reviews already developed by the DNB. As discussed further below, 
“groupthink” at the board level and lack of effective challenges have been 
found to be significant contributing factors to ineffective cultures in 
financial services firms and the DNB has developed particular expertise in 
assessing such issues. 
Thirdly, boards may benefit from encouraging the industry to address 
more clearly the “purpose” of a financial services firm and its wider role 
in society (i.e. going beyond the aim of pursuing profits, which is an 
intended outcome of any business “purpose”). Under the 2018 U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code,17 for example, one of the key functions of 
the board is to establish the company’s purpose. Any proper consideration 
of this issue would serve to tackle a core issue of public concern, namely 
that the financial services industry cannot be trusted because its mindset is 
one of focusing on short-term profitability to the detriment of any 
stakeholders other than shareholders.18 The idea of the “purpose” of a 
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corporation in society is one of increasing public debate19 and boards of 
financial services firms could assist in improving trust in the industry by 
encouraging constructive engagement on this issue. 
The particular benefit of developing industry-wide standards, 
benchmarking, and peer-pressure around these issues is that, as noted by 
the DNB, “in essence, peer pressure regulates behaviour.”20 
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY A FIRM’S “CULTURE”? 
While most financial services firms will likely have in place detailed 
values statements, codes of conduct, and various processes and procedures 
that are intended to ensure that all employees of the firm behave in 
accordance with specified standards of behavior, the “way things get done 
around here” will likely be more complex than can be described in written 
documents and can often diverge from the high-level general expectations 
set out in the firm’s documentation. 
Employees are more likely to look to their peers and “tone from the 
top” than to written manuals of the firm for guidance on what behaviors 
are acceptable within the firm. As noted above, “in essence, peer pressure 
regulates behaviour.”21 Additionally, “[f]or employees, organisational 
culture is the social glue that holds the organisation together by providing 
appropriate standards for the ways employees should behave. As a 
consequence, culture reduces employees’ uncertainty and anxiety about 
appropriate and expected behaviours.”22 
An important theoretical framework for identifying and assessing 
organizational culture has been provided by the organizational 
psychologist Edgar Schein.23 The DNB’s model for assessing firms’ 
culture is strongly based on Schein’s conceptual model.24 
According to Schein, culture exists simultaneously on three different 
levels: (1) on the surface are artifacts; (2) under the surface are espoused 
values and beliefs; and (3) at the core are basic assumptions. The DNB 
uses the metaphor of an iceberg to describe these three levels because only 
the first layer is directly observable. 
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The first level, the artifacts of a firm, are the “visible and feelable” 
phenomena in a firm: the “phenomena that you would see, hear and feel 
when you encounter a new group with an unfamiliar culture.”25 
For present purposes, these artifacts include, for example, the formal 
governance structure of a financial services firm, its values statement, its 
code of conduct, and its formal policies relating to financial incentives for 
staff, diversity, and inclusion. These artifacts also include observable 
behaviors. The DNB’s supervisory approach in relation to this layer of the 
iceberg involves reviewing the behaviors of firms’ senior leadership teams 
in relation to decisionmaking, leadership, and communication. 
Clearly, the board has the key role in approving many of these 
“artifacts,” including those relating to, for example, a firm’s statement of 
its values and its code of conduct.26 
The second level of culture, espoused values and beliefs, are the 
consciously understood and spoken of assumptions of the group, or firm, 
as to their values and beliefs; they are “explicitly articulated because they 
serve the normative or moral function of guiding members of the group as 
to how to deal with certain key situations as well as in training new 
members how to behave.”27 
For the DNB, this layer of its iceberg metaphor involves assessing 
group dynamics, in particular at the level of the senior leaders. In its 
assessments of firms, the DNB looks at the “atmosphere” of interactions 
within groups, in particular the senior leadership team (management board 
in a two-tier board structure). It looks at issues such as: Is there an 
atmosphere where people can address unwanted or “bad” behavior? Is 
there an atmosphere of co-operation or competition, perhaps infighting? Is 
there a basis of mutual trust within a (management) board, between the 
senior management and the board, or does mistrust dominate in the 
working relationship?28 
Boardroom dynamics can be assessed at this level of the “iceberg” 
and can have an important impact on a firm’s “tone from the top,” and 
hence, overall culture.29 
Assessing these two levels, however, may not be sufficient. The third 
level, relating to taken-for-granted underlying basic assumptions, is a key 
level. These are assumptions about behavior, where members of a group 
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holding these assumptions may find behavior based on any other premise 
“inconceivable.”30 The DNB has described this layer as the “mindset.”31 
According to Schein, where a leader identifies a culture involving 
widespread discrepancies between desired behaviors and observed 
behaviors, in order to achieve culture change the leader will need to “locate 
the cultural DNA and change some of that,”32 or in other words, address 
culture issues at the level of taken-for-granted underlying basic 
assumptions and not merely at the level of artifacts or espoused values and 
beliefs.33 
Based on Schein, the DNB also notes that a detailed understanding 
of all three layers is necessary in order to understand organizational culture 
and to be able to target changes.34 
Schein’s model is helpful for the purposes of considering what 
aspects of a culture can be influenced or managed by a board. We rely on 
Schein’s model for the purposes of our discussion of suggestions on this 
issue in Part VI below—particularly, the issue of considering the purpose 
of a firm. 
II. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS ON BOARDS TO 
APPROVE AND OVERSEE CORPORATE CULTURE 
As noted above, the 2015 Basel Corporate Governance Principles for 
Banks provide that the board of a bank has the overall responsibility for 
the bank, including approving and overseeing corporate culture.35 These 
Principles note that “a fundamental component of good governance is a 
corporate culture of reinforcing appropriate norms for responsible and 
ethical behaviour” and state that, in order to promote a sound corporate 
culture, the board should reinforce the “tone from the top” by: 
 Setting and adhering to corporate values that create expectations 
that all business should be conducted in a legal and ethical 
manner, and overseeing the adherence to such values by senior 
management and other employees; 
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2020] The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms 731 
 Promoting risk awareness within a strong risk culture, conveying 
the board’s expectation that it does not support excessive risk-
taking, and that all employees are responsible for helping the 
bank operate within the established risk appetite and risk limits; 
 Confirming that appropriate steps have been or are being taken 
to communicate throughout the bank the corporate values, 
professional standards, or codes of conduct it sets, together with 
supporting policies; and 
 Confirming that employees, including senior management, are 
aware that appropriate disciplinary or other actions will follow 
unacceptable behaviours and transgressions.36 
The Basel Corporate Governance Principles also provide that an 
appropriate code of conduct should be put in place, and that Boards should 
have oversight of the whistleblowing policy mechanism and of ensuring 
that senior management addresses legitimate issues that are raised. 
Additionally, the board should oversee and approve how, and by whom, 
legitimate material concerns should be investigated and addressed by an 
objective, independent internal or external body—senior management, the 
board itself, or both.37 At the EU level, these principles are reflected in the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on Internal Governance.38 
More recently, the 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance Code,39 which 
came into force in January 2019, provides that: “The board should 
establish the company’s purpose, values and strategy, and satisfy itself that 
these and its culture are aligned. All directors must act with integrity, lead 
by example, and promote the desired culture.”40 In addition, 
The board should assess and monitor culture. Where it is not satisfied 
that policy, practices or behaviour throughout the business are 
aligned with the company’s purpose, values and strategy, it should 
seek assurance that management has taken corrective action. The 
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annual report should explain the board’s activities and any action 
taken.41 
Whilst the legal responsibility on boards to approve and oversee an 
appropriate culture is clear, the practical difficulties faced by boards must 
also be recognized. As noted in an important 2015 G30 report setting out 
recommendations for culture change in the industry: 
Most Boards struggle in addressing culture. Difficulty defining the 
underlying concepts, a lack of clear metrics, diffuse responsibilities 
across the Executive team, a lack of sufficient time to consider 
cultural issues properly, and lack of visibility on key cultural issues 
are cited as challenges to improving the Board’s oversight and 
engagement on conduct and values.42 
III. HIGH-PROFILE RECENT EXAMPLES OF BOARD FAILURES 
A number of reports into the failings of banks in the run-up to the 
financial crisis in 2007–2008, highlighted failures of the boards, 
particularly in terms of failures to challenge the executive effectively. The 
2009 Walker Review, which reported at the behest of the U.K. Prime 
Minister on corporate governance in the U.K. banking industry and made 
recommendations for reform, emphasized that “[t]he most critical need is 
for an environment in which effective challenge of the executive is 
expected and achieved in the boardroom before decisions are taken on 
major risk and strategic issues.” 43 More generally, as noted in the above-
mentioned 2015 G30 report, 
In the lead-up to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, Boards in certain 
banks allowed their management to take decisions and actions that 
ultimately led to poor outcomes for the firms’ employees, customers, 
shareholders, and the wider economy. Boards had neither sufficient 
expertise nor the ability to effectively challenge management 
strategies. And Board decisions suffered from self-reinforcing 
groupthink and herd behavior.44 
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The April 2013 Salz review45 of the business practices of Barclays 
PLC prior to the financial crisis, also provides useful insights into the 
governance and culture problems that gave rise to excessive risk-taking 
and ethical issues. With regard specifically to the role of the board, the 
report notes: 
The board sets the tone from the top of the organisation, and must 
carry ultimate responsibility for its values, culture and business 
practices. With the benefit of hindsight, we believe that the Barclays 
Board did not give sufficient attention to this area. We also believe 
the Board found it difficult at times to penetrate into what was a large, 
complex organisation. It was significantly stretched in coping with 
the many issues that arose in the financial crisis – the Board met on 
30 occasions in 2008 (at times by conference call) and 27 times in 
2009 – and many of the events that have raised questions about 
culture and business practices only clearly emerged after the 
beginning of the financial crisis. 
One of the principal roles of the Board is to provide challenge to 
management. Whether it is successful is influenced by a number of 
factors, including the composition of the Board, the skills of the 
Chairman, Board members’ understanding of the Group’s businesses, 
the time they have to give, the openness of the executive directors 
and the information available to the Board. Barclays has made 
progress in improving the specialist financial experience on the 
Board, as well as its diversity, but there is more to be done.46 
The findings of the U.K. Parliamentary Commission into banking 
standards, in its June 2013 report Changing Banking for Good,47 were 
starker. 
Banks whose board-level governance arrangements could be 
described on paper as approximating to best practice have run into 
serious governance problems. There were frequently several 
common elements to bank governance failures. Some CEOs were 
overly dominant, which the Board as a whole failed to control. 
                                                     
 45. See generally ANTHONY SALZ, SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’ 
BUSINESS PRACTICES (2013) [hereinafter SALZ REVIEW], https://online.wsj.com/public/resou 
rces/documents/SalzReview04032013.pdf[https://perma.cc/5HLU-7BCT]. 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING 
STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, VOL. 1, 2013, HC 175-I, at 4 (UK), https://www 
.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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Chairmen proved weak; often they were too close to, and became 
cheerleaders for, the CEO. NEDs provided insufficient scrutiny of, 
or challenge to, the executive, and were too often advocates for 
expansion rather than cautioning of the risks involved. There was 
insufficient wider banking experience among NEDs and the 
resources available to them were inadequate. Central functions, 
including risk and control, had insufficient capability and status to 
perform their functions and were often regarded as an impediment to 
the business, rather than essential to its long-term success.48 
The U.K. Parliamentary Commission also identified the importance 
of individual accountability at the highest levels. 
Too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have operated 
in an environment with insufficient personal responsibility. Top 
bankers dodged accountability for failings on their watch by claiming 
ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making. They then 
faced little realistic prospect of financial penalties or more serious 
sanctions commensurate with the severity of the failures with which 
they were associated. Individual incentives have not been consistent 
with high collective standards, often the opposite.49 
In Ireland, the 2011 Nyberg Commission of Investigation into the 
Banking Sector noted, with regard to the responsibilities of the Board: 
“Banks’ management and boards embraced a lending sales culture at the 
expense of prudence and risk management.50 This view then spread down 
through the ranks, partly through the effects of volume targets and bonus 
systems and partly through indoctrination, causing the massive run-up in 
risky assets.”51 More recently, in a July 2018 report on the culture of the 
five retail banks in Ireland,52 the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) noted that 
Irish banks have a way to go in developing a customer-focused culture; as 
to the role of boards, the CBI noted that more needs to be done to improve 
the effectiveness of challenges at the board level.53 
Furthermore, in Australia, the April 2018 report by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) into the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (CBA), the largest financial institution in Australia, provides 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 41. 
 49. Id. at 8. 
 50. See generally COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN IRELAND, 
MISJUDGING RISK: CAUSES OF THE SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS IN IRELAND 96 (2011), https:// 
www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Documents/Misjuding%20Risk%20-%20Causes%20of%20the%20 
Systemic%20Banking%20Crisis%20in%20Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GCL-8HU7]. 
 51. Id. at 96. 
 52. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8. 
 53. Id. at 30. 
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some interesting insights into the role of the board and board failings. 54 
This report, following a number of misconduct issues at the bank, found 
that there were significant shortcomings in governance and management 
of nonfinancial risk. In particular, it found that the board “did not 
demonstrate rigour of oversight and challenge to CBA management” or 
“have the right balance of both summarised and detailed reporting” in 
relation to non-financial risks.55 With regard to customers, CBA’s board 
focused on aggregate customer satisfaction survey results (such as Net 
Promoter Scores, discussed further below) and alarm bells from the 
treatment of aggrieved customers “did not sound loudly.”56 “Although 
CBA has drawn comfort from strong customer satisfaction metrics, which 
reflect an aggregated view of customer sentiment, it has missed the tail 
where customer issues reside.”57 
More recently, in February 2019, the Australian Royal Commission 
report58 into misconduct in the Australian financial services industry was 
published. This report was highly critical of the extent of misconduct in 
the financial services industry in Australia and noted that primary 
responsibility lies with the entities and “those who managed and controlled 
those entities: their boards and senior management.”59 
A. Board “Blind Spots”: Wells Fargo 
The recent Wells Fargo scandal is an example of a board “blind 
spot,” in that the commercial success of a particular business model 
blinded it to the underlying conduct risks of the model. Specifically, it 
appears that the Board failed to consider/look for information on whether 
the successful business model was in line with the stated values of the firm. 
 Essentially, the Community Bank business of Wells Fargo in the 
U.S. incentivized/pressured its staff to cross-sell products to existing 
clients—in particular to open new bank accounts and take on new 
services.60 The pressures on sales staff to meet overly-ambitious sales 
                                                     
 54. JOHN LAKER ET AL., AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., PRUDENTIAL INQUIRY INTO 
THE COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (2018), https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default 
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 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 92. 
 58. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND 
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 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. The then-Wells Fargo Chairman and CEO, John Stumpf, regularly used the infamous mantra 
“eight is great” to motivate staff to get customers to take eight of the company’s products. Maggie 
McGrath, How the Wells Fargo Phony Account Scandal Sunk, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2016), 
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targets resulted in them taking short cuts or engaging in fraudulent activity 
to meet their sales targets. In 2016, Wells Fargo was fined $185 million 
by U.S. regulators for these activities.61 Additionally, as noted in an 
October 2018 settlement agreement between Wells Fargo and the Attorney 
General for the State of New York, Wells Fargo was fined $65 million. 
As a result of its cross-sell driven sales culture, certain Wells Fargo 
employees engaged in the following misconduct without customer 
knowledge or consent: opened deposit accounts; transferred funds 
from customers’ authorized accounts in order to temporarily fund 
unauthorized accounts; used email addresses not belonging to 
customers to enroll customers in on-line banking services; requested 
debit cards and created personal identification numbers (PINs) in 
order to activate them; and submitted applications for and obtained 
credit cards.62 
The mis-selling affected approximately 3.5 million customer 
accounts.63 In July 2017, Wells Fargo announced that, following a review, 
it would provide a total of $2.8 million in refunds and credits due to 
customers on top of $3.3 million previously refunded.64 
In June 2018, Wells Fargo settled a class action lawsuit in California 
relating to these practices for $142 million.65 Wells Fargo has also been 
forced to pay compensation to former employees of the firm who lost their 
jobs as a result of whistleblowing about the sales practices—in one case 
the compensation amounted to $5.4 million.66 
In testimony to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, John Stumpf, 
the Chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo during the period in question, 
famously stated that what had happened at the bank went against “our 
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 62. Settlement Agreement at 3, In the Matter of Wells Fargo & Company, No. 18-121 (Oct. 18, 
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values, ethics and culture and runs counter to our business strategy.”67 In 
October 2016, he resigned from Wells Fargo.68 
On February 2, 2018, the U.S. Federal Reserve issued a letter69 to 
Mr. Stumpf, in his capacity as then Chair of the Board of Wells Fargo, 
noting that Wells Fargo pursued sales strategies that “motivated 
compliance violations and improper practices”70 and that Mr. Stumpf was 
aware of sales practices issues but failed to investigate them or inform the 
Board about them in a timely manner.71 The U.S. Federal Reserve letter 
concluded by stating, “[Y]our performance in addressing these problems 
is an example of ineffective oversight that is not consistent with the 
Federal Reserve’s expectations for a firm of [Wells Fargo’s] size and 
scope of operations.”72 
In April 2017, Wells Fargo published a report73 on the mis-selling 
scandal, which was commissioned by independent directors of the Board 
of Wells Fargo. This report gives some useful insights into the background 
of the mis-selling. The principal findings of this report included 
The root cause of sales practice failures was the distortion of the 
Community Bank’s sales culture and performance management 
system, which, when combined with aggressive sales management, 
created pressure on employees to sell unwanted or unneeded products 
to customers and, in some cases, to open unauthorized accounts. 
Wells Fargo’s decentralized corporate structure gave too much 
autonomy to the Community Bank’s senior leadership, who were 
unwilling to change the sales model or even recognize it as the root 
cause of the problem. Community Bank leadership resisted and 
impeded outside scrutiny or oversight and, when forced to report, 
minimized the scale and nature of the problem.74 
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The report found that sales practice violations were identified as far 
back as 2002—when the Community Bank took steps to address it, 
including through the creation of a sales integrity task force.75 The volume 
of sale practice violations steadily increased over time.76 Carrie Tolstedt 
took over as CEO of Community Bank in 2007.77 Her aggressive sales 
approach was fully supported by Wells Fargo CEO, John Stumpf, who 
considered her to be the “best banker in America.”78 
It appears that, at least prior to the October 2013 and December 2013, 
articles in the Los Angeles Times about the sales practices showed that the 
practices were not considered to be a material issue within Wells Fargo.79 
This was despite the fact that between 2011 and 2016, over 5,300 Wells 
Fargo employees were fired for sales practice violations80—indeed, Mr. 
Stumpf concluded as late as May 2015 that the fact that around 1,000 
employees per year were fired because of sales practice violations, meant 
“[t]his is not systemic.”81 Also, as far back as 2004, an Internal 
Investigations report that went to the Chief Auditor of Wells Fargo found 
that staff “feel they cannot make sales goals without gaming the system. 
The incentive to cheat is based on the fear of losing their jobs for not 
meeting performance expectations” and that this gave rise to ethical issues 
and reputational risks for Wells Fargo.82 
Importantly, “The Community Bank identified itself as a sales 
organization, like a department or retail stores, rather than a service-
oriented financial institution. This provided justification for a relentless 
focus on sales, abbreviated training and high employee turnover.”83 
Indeed, from 2011 to 2015, the average annual staff turnover was 30%, 
reaching 41% for the twelve-month period to October 2012.84 
Additionally, the April 2017 report of the independent directors found that 
This underreaction to sales practice issues resulted in part from the 
incorrect belief, extending well into 2015, that improper practices did 
not cause any “customer harm”; and “customer harm” itself was 
narrowly construed to mean only financial harm such as fees and 
penalties. This flawed perspective made it easy to undervalue the risk 
to Wells Fargo’s brand and reputation arising from the misuse of 
                                                     
 75. Id. at 31. 
 76. Id. at 6. 
 77. Id. at 19. 
 78. Id. at 56. 
 79. See id. at 32. 
 80. Id. at 16. 
 81. Id. at 55–56. 
 82. Id. at 89. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. Id. at 27–28. 
2020] The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms 739 
customer information and the breaches of trust occasioned by 
improper sales practices.85 
More generally, an important factor was that CEO John Stumpf was 
Wells Fargo’s principal proponent of the cross-sell and general sales 
culture. Also, he “was not perceived within Wells Fargo as someone who 
wanted to hear bad news or deal with conflict.”86 
As to the role of the Board, the report found that the Board’s actions 
could have been improved in three respects: (1) it should have centralized 
the risk function sooner than it actually did—in 2016; (2) from 2014, when 
it was informed of the sales practices as a noteworthy risk, it should have 
insisted on more detailed and concrete plans from the various reporting 
functions; and (3) it should have been more forceful in pushing Mr. Stumpf 
to remove Carrie Tolstedt as CEO of the Community Bank, at least by 
October 2015.87 
The report was widely criticized in the press when it was published88 
because it appeared to be overly generous to the Wells Fargo Board. In 
particular, the report notes that “[t]here was a growing conflict over time 
in the Community Bank between Wells Fargo’s Vision & Values and the 
Community Bank’s emphasis on sales goals”89—but the report fails to 
consider this central question in any meaningful way and the Board’s 
responsibility for addressing it. This growing conflict was evident from 
whistle-blower reports that could and should have been considered by the 
Wells Fargo Board. For example, an April 2017 report by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency90 noted that by 2010, there had been about 
700 whistle-blower complaints of gaming of the incentive plans91—this 
volume of whistle-blower complaints alone should have been a “red flag” 
to the Board. Furthermore, the Wells Fargo Board was, at best, remarkably 
incurious about the high volume of staff turnover at the Community Bank, 
along with the nature and volume of firings for sales practice violations 
and the reasons for these firings. Ultimately, the Board failed to attach 
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adequate importance to ensuring that the culture of Wells Fargo lived up 
to the espoused values of the firm. 
B. Board “Blind Spots”: U.K. Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) 
The U.K. PPI issue provides a useful example of a board blind spot 
of focusing on the commercial benefits of the high profitability of a 
product, while ignoring the potential conduct risks inherent in such high 
profitability. 
PPI policies are intended to assist borrowers in loan repayment where 
they are otherwise unable to do so because of a specified event (e.g., loss 
of job or illness). In the U.K., they were typically offered by banks and 
other credit providers when providing credit to consumers (e.g., for a 
mortgage or unsecured loan). 
PPI was a very lucrative business for the banks in the U.K.. For 
example, Barclays Bank PPI comprised between 32% and 42% of its U.K. 
retail and business bank pre-tax profit between 2001 and 2005, when 
almost 70% of borrowers taking some loan products also bought a policy. 
Additionally, between 2002 and 2012, Barclays’ total revenues from PPI, 
net of claims, and provisions for alleged mis-selling amounted to an 
estimated £940 million.92 
A 2005 Citizens Advice report described the PPI business in the U.K. 
(with its estimated 20 million policies in force and annual gross premiums 
in excess of £5 billion) as a “protection racket.”93 Indeed, concerns about 
mis-selling of PPI had been in the public domain in the U.K. since at least 
1998.94 The mis-selling involved various practices such as selling PPI to 
customers who were not eligible to claim on the policy; high-pressure sales 
tactics, giving people the impression that they had to take out PPI in order 
to get a loan; and various exclusions which significantly limited the scope 
of the potential benefits sales to people with no incomes to protect. In 
2009, the U.K. Financial Services Authority estimated that PPI mis-selling 
may have affected around three million people in the U.K. since the 
1990s.95 
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The PPI market was investigated by the U.K. Competition 
Commission.96 Its 2009 inquiry report noted that there was considerable 
customer confusion about the features and benefits of PPI97—there was 
evidence of consumers being under the impression that their credit 
application was more likely to be successful if they also bought PPI.98 
Additionally, PPI customers were more likely to earn below the national 
average wage or come from more disadvantaged socio-economic sections 
of society.99 The Competition Commission’s 2011 market investigation 
order imposed various restrictions on future selling of PPI.100 As of 
September 2019, financial services firms in the U.K. have refunded over 
£36.4 billion to customers affected by the PPI mis-selling in the U.K..101 
As to the role of the boards of firms involved in the PPI scandal, it 
appears from the Competition Commission investigation report that PPI 
was discussed at the board level, but the focus of the discussion was on its 
profitability. The Salz Review found that the Barclay Bank Group 
Executive Committee reviewed PPI in 2005; it found that PPI was “highly 
profitable” and was aware that “there were potential concerns relating to 
the fairness of single premium policies, policies sold where customers 
could not make claims and sales practices that were ‘not customer 
friendly’ or ‘high pressure.’”102 The Salz Review criticized Barclays Bank, 
stating that “the high profitability of PPI should have raised questions as 
to whether this was consistent with Barclays’ obligations to customers,” it 
was “slow to address control failures” and “[t]he culture of the bank had 
developed into one which at times valued meeting financial targets more 
than meeting customer needs.”103 These are all issues that could and should 
have been addressed at an early stage at the board level. It is likely that the 
conclusions of the Salz Review regarding PPI mis-selling could equally 
apply to the other U.K. banks and other financial institutions that mis-sold 
PPI in the U.K.. 
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C. Board “Blind Spots”: Danske Bank 
The recent Danske Bank scandal is an example of a board blind spot: 
uncritical acceptance of indications from a second line of defense function 
(compliance, in this case) that outstanding potential conduct risk concerns 
relating to anti-money laundering were being ineffectively addressed 
within the bank. 
Danske Bank, the largest financial institution in Denmark, 
established a presence in Estonia when it acquired Sampo Bank together 
with its Estonian branch in 2007.104 
The Estonian branch had a specific “Non-Resident Portfolio” of non-
resident clients from 2007 to 2015 (when the non-resident accounts were 
closed). There had been around 10,000 non-resident customers in this 
Portfolio,105 many from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.106 During the 
period 2007–2015, there was a flow of funds amounting to approximately 
€200 billion from external parties to these non-resident bank accounts and 
on to external third parties.107 
Concerns about the possible use of these non-resident accounts for 
money laundering emerged from 2007. This scandal was reported on by a 
Danish law firm for the Danske Bank Board in September 2018, sometime 
after the issue became the subject of significant public comment, stating 
that108 
In 2007, shortly after completing the acquisition of Sampo Bank, 
Danske Bank had a real opportunity to conclude that the Non-
Resident Portfolio involved suspicious activity not caught by AML 
procedures at Sampo Pank in Estonia. In 2007, the Estonian FSA 
came out with a critical inspection report, and at the same time 
Danske Bank at Group level received specific information from the 
Russian Central Bank, through the Danish FSA. This information 
pointed to possible ‘tax and custom payments evasion’ and ‘criminal 
activity in its pure form, including money laundering’, estimated at 
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‘billions of rubles monthly’. However, Danske Bank missed this first 
real opportunity.109 
In 2007, the above letter from the Russian Central Bank was on the 
agenda of a Danske Bank Board meeting and information was given to the 
effect that the matter would be investigated internally.110 Additionally, a 
2007 anti-money laundering inspection by the Estonian regulator found 
that the Estonian branch of Danske Bank did not fully comply with 
relevant legal requirements.111 
A further red flag that should have been considered by the Board of 
Danske Bank at the time was that, whereas the Estonian branch’s share of 
total assets of the Danske Bank group was minuscule, at 0.5%, at its height 
in 2011, it represented only 10.7% of the group’s entire profits before 
tax.112 
The issue became a matter of public concern following the 
publication of news reports in March 2017 of a “Russian Laundromat” 
money laundering operation in which the Danske Bank entity featured 
prominently.113 News stories about an “Azerbaijani Laundromat” emerged 
subsequently in 2017.114 
The report to the Danske Bank Board concluded that neither the 
Danske Bank group CEO nor Board had breached their respective legal 
obligations. 
[I]t is clear that problems were reported to the Board of Directors and 
the Audit Committee, and it is equally clear that such reporting was 
accompanied by assurances that problems were being dealt with and 
mitigation was ongoing. This information came from within the bank 
where the severity of the situation and the risks facing the bank had 
not been comprehended, and this affected the reporting. In hindsight, 
the question may be raised whether the Board of Directors or the 
Audit Committee could reasonably have done more. This, however, 
would not, in our view, form sufficient basis for legal criticism when 
taking into account the information available combined with the 
nature and extent of the responsibilities of the Board of Directors.115 
As with the above-mentioned report, commissioned by the Board of 
Wells Fargo,116 the conclusions of this report, which was commissioned 
by the Board of Danske Bank, seem somewhat narrowly focused and 
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generous to the Board and CEO in light of the above information that was 
available to it. 
In any event, shortly after the publication of this report, the then CEO 
resigned and the chairman was removed at the behest of the bank’s largest 
shareholder in order to “strengthen the bank’s ability to address its culture, 
compliance program and engagement with regulators.”117 Various national 
investigations into the issues are on-going.118 
IV. ENHANCING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS ROLE OF OVERSEEING A 
FIRM’S CULTURE—ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED 
Quite apart from board failures in addressing key structural issues 
that give rise to conduct risk issues, such as lack of diversity and distorted 
financial incentives—having the effect of incentivizing staff not to take 
adequate account of customer interests—the recent reports and high-
profile cases outlined in the previous section have highlighted significant 
further failings of boards, particularly those discussed below. 
A. Lack of Adequate Data 
Boards have often failed to attach sufficient importance to ensuring 
that they receive sufficiently useful and adequate data that would give 
them insight into whether there is a material divergence between the firm’s 
espoused values and how it actually behaves in practice. Such data would 
provide potentially important early-warning signals to the board of 
possible issues around, for example, excessive risk-taking and unethical 
conduct, illegal conduct, or both. This was one of the areas where the 
recent Australian Royal Commission report was particularly critical of 
financial institutions, noting that “too often, boards did not get the right 
information about emerging non-financial risks; did not do enough to seek 
further or better information where what they had was clearly deficient; 
and did not do enough with the information they had to oversee and 
challenge management’s approach to these risks.”119 The Royal 
Commission report emphasized that boards must have the right 
information in order to discharge their functions: 
When I refer to boards having the right information, I am not 
referring to boards having more information. As I noted earlier, it is 
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the quality, not the quantity, of information that must increase. Often, 
improving the quality of information given to boards will require 
giving directors less material and more information.  
I do not pretend to be able to offer any single answer to how 
boards can ensure that they receive the right information. But boards 
and management must keep considering how to present information 
about the right issues, in the right way.120 
Similarly, in a recent U.S. report on corporate governance it was 
noted that “if the board relies solely on management reports, the risk is 
that information may be incomplete, filtered, or edited, even in good-faith 
ways. The general name for this problem is ‘asymmetric information,’ and 
this imbalance can weaken the board’s ability to oversee the corporation 
properly.”121 In this regard, whilst a board might take some comfort from 
knowing that adequate processes and procedures are in place to enable and 
facilitate speaking up within the firm, this is of relatively little use in 
practice if staff within the firm do not actually feel comfortable speaking 
up about sensitive matters and the board remains ill-informed about 
potential issues. 
Additionally, when assessing customer-related data, boards can often 
focus on data that will not give them a sufficient insight into customer 
outcomes. For example, often boards rely on data relating to complaints 
made by customers, although many poor customer outcomes may not give 
rise to customer complaints until long after the customer harm has arisen, 
if at all. Also, a customer-related metric commonly used by boards is the 
Net Promoter Score. As noted in a recent report by the New Zealand 
financial services regulator: 
Many banks used a survey tool known as “Net Promoter Score”, 
which gauges customer loyalty. These surveys are typically done 
immediately after the customer interacts with the bank. However, the 
harm caused by poor product design or inappropriate sales or advice 
may not manifest for years. We do not consider Net Promoter Score 
or other similar surveys sufficient to measure customer outcomes.122 
It must be recognized, however, that this is a complex issue. As noted 
in a recent G30 report, “[b]anks are searching for metrics to assist in 
monitoring and understanding cultural progress over time, and while a 
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broad range of metrics has been adopted, most banks are still 
experimenting and have neither found a definitive set of indicators nor 
concluded what those metrics should be.”123 
B. Ineffective Challenge of Management 
Boards have failed to challenge executive management adequately 
and effectively. It may be difficult for boards to effectively perform this 
essential task of supervision of executive management in circumstances 
where the executive management has not provided the board with 
adequate data to enable them to do so. This can arise where, for example, 
the executive management has a conscious or unconscious bias against 
providing data to the board that may raise an issue with the performance 
of the executive management. This is a matter for the board to resolve, 
given its overall responsibility for corporate governance. 
Lack of effective challenge can also arise where there are issues of 
groupthink at board level, where the board chooses—again, consciously 
or unconsciously—not to dig too deeply and challenge generally accepted 
approaches within the firm. 
A group, such as a board, is particularly vulnerable to groupthink 
when its members are similar in background, the group is insulated from 
outside opinions, and there are no clear rules for decision-making.124 
Additionally, 
One of the root causes of Groupthink is cultural cohesiveness. In a 
cohesive group, members avoid speaking out against decisions, avoid 
arguing with others and work towards maintaining friendly 
relationships in the group. If cohesiveness gets to such a high level 
that there are no longer disagreements between members, then the 
group is ripe for Groupthink.125 
In light of this potential problem of groupthink, regulators 
internationally have increasingly focused attention on ensuring increased 
diversity at the board level, including gender diversity, given that “a lack 
of diversity at senior management and board level is a leading indicator of 
heightened behaviour and culture risks.”126 
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C. Over-Focus on Short-Term Profitability 
Boards have focused on short-term profitability to the detriment of 
longer-term sustainability or to an adequate consideration of stakeholders 
other than shareholders. This shareholder value “mindset” has resulted in 
decisions being taken at board level (or issues not being adequately 
considered at board level) that have eventually proven to be very costly to 
the financial services firms, as well as to their customers and to wider 
society.127 
In the sections below, we consider how boards could improve their 
effectiveness in relation to each of these three issues, and in particular, in 
the context of an industry-wide approach that could facilitate the 
development of (1) improved norms of behavior across the industry (i.e., 
greater clarity around what “good” performance looks like for boards, as 
opposed to mere minimum legal requirements); (2) benchmarked 
assessments that could enable boards to gain a better insight into how they 
are progressing, in particular by reference to the industry as a whole; and 
(3) peer pressure to improve performance. 
V. THE BENEFITS OF INDUSTRY-WIDE INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THESE 
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS ISSUES 
Before considering the above three specific proposals for an 
industry-wide approach, we should first consider the benefits of 
addressing these issues on an industry-wide basis. 
A. The “Coordination Failure” Problem 
In the first place, in our view, certain types of industry initiatives 
have the potential to improve firms’ cultures because they can address the 
“coordination failure” problem identified by the New York Federal 
Reserve. A December 2017 New York Federal Reserve White Paper on 
“Misconduct Risk, Culture and Supervision”128 identifies a number of 
market failures to explain why firms do not invest adequately in “cultural 
capital,” the reasoning including coordination failures. The coordination 
failures reflect the inability of private actors to reach a common objective 
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that is in the collective best interest—this is because short-term 
competitive pressures make it difficult to invest in longer-term cultural 
capital. 
In this regard, the financial services industry as a whole is becoming 
increasingly aware of the positive impact of a good ethical culture on its 
business success and the profitability.129 This may become an increasingly 
significant factor, in particular, in those areas of the financial services 
industry that are, as a result of technological innovation and regulatory 
change, opening up to competitors who are not traditional financial 
services operators. There is also the potential benefit of lower compliance 
costs in the longer term as improved culture leads to fewer breaches of 
regulatory requirements (for example, where an improved culture of 
speaking up leads to potential regulatory issues being identified and 
addressed at a much earlier stage than they might otherwise be) and a more 
constructive relationship with the regulator. 
The New York Federal Reserve White Paper recognizes that “the 
Group of Thirty efforts around standard-setting and convening the 
industry and the U.K.’s Banking Standards Board should help solve 
coordination failures and drive industry solutions.”130 
The U.K. Banking Standards Board—and the setting up in Ireland of 
an equivalent industry-funded body, the Irish Banking Culture Board—
provides a particularly interesting forum for industry initiatives to improve 
banking culture. 
In this regard, the U.K. Banking Standards Board states that its role 
is to “provide challenge, support and scrutiny for firms committed to 
rebuilding the sector’s reputation, and it will provide impartial and 
objective assessments of the industry’s progress.”131 It is partly doing this 
through annual assessments of member banks (carried out through, inter 
alia, an anonymous survey questionnaire within firms and interviews) and 
the publication of non-firm specific information about the results of the 
assessments.132 
B. Peer Pressure 
Peer pressure is a key influencer of behaviors and can be used to 
complement regulation to improve behaviors (if appropriately harnessed). 
                                                     
 129. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES & RUTH STEINHOLTZ, ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICE AND 
REGULATION: A BEHAVIOURAL AND VALUES-BASED APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 104–107 (2017). 
 130. CHALY ET AL., supra note 128, at 15–16. 
 131. What is the BSB?, supra note 5. 
 132. Assessment Results, BANKING STANDARDS BOARD (2018), https://www.bankingstandards 
board.org.uk/assessment-results-2018/ [https://perma.cc/SLF6-QLCT]. 
2020] The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms 749 
As noted by the DNB, “In essence, peer pressure regulates behaviour.”133 
Additionally, the 2013 U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards report, which recommended the creation of an industry 
standards body in the U.K., stated that 
[It] believe[s] that the influence of a professional body for banking 
could assist the development of the culture within the industry by 
introducing non-financial incentives, which nonetheless have 
financial implications, such as peer pressure and the potential to 
shame and discipline miscreants. Such a body could, by its very 
existence, be a major force for cultural change.134 
A peer-based approach can serve to identify best practice 
internationally—in relation to matters such as constructive challenge at 
board meetings, to address groupthink concerns—and facilitate the 
“normalization” of such practices and their “internalization,” so that 
executives and board members more readily accept these norms as the 
appropriate way to behave rather than merely a form of regulatory 
requirement or expectation to be tolerated, at best. 
As to whether there are sufficient incentives for the industry to 
engage meaningfully in such peer-based initiatives, at least in Ireland, 
there is significant political pressure on banks to improve their culture,135 
particularly in light of the recent tracker mortgage scandal, and this 
political pressure gave rise to the creation of the Irish Banking Culture 
Board.136 
C. Focusing of Resources 
Industry initiatives in this area enable firms to combine and focus 
resources on complex multi-disciplinary issues relating to behaviours that 
firms may have practical difficulties in addressing on their own (or may 
be unprepared to invest internally or provide the resources to invest in 
external experts to address these issues).137 
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D. The Benefits/Drawbacks of Relying on Regulators to Achieve Culture 
Change 
It must be recognized that in terms of addressing complex 
behavioural issues within firms, only so much can be achieved by the 
imposition of increasingly onerous regulatory requirements, greater 
regulatory scrutiny, and increased sanctions on firms and individuals. For 
example, a 2016 U.K. Financial Conduct Authority paper found that 
The evidence that we have suggests that there are limitations on the 
extent to which greater compliance can be achieved by increasing 
fines and the probability of detection. For example, there is a 
tendency of certain firms to carry on breaking rules in spite of 
continuing to accrue large fines.138 
More generally, relying wholly on increased regulation and 
enforcement can be counterproductive in terms of improving behaviours. 
As argued by Hodges and Steinholtz in their recent book Ethical Business 
Practice and Regulation, 
An increase in monitoring, reporting and compliance in general can 
inadvertently increase unethical behaviour, as people feel they are 
not trusted. Companies can spend large amounts of energy on 
compliance and have little left over for ethics. Focusing on rules 
crowds out objective thought on whether behaviour is ethical. 
Focusing on compliance can engender cynicism and disengagement, 
as the implicit message is ‘we are only doing this because it is the 
law’ and ‘we don’t trust you’. Disengagement clearly feeds unethical 
behaviour directly and indirectly as disengaged employees are less 
likely to speak up and report issues.139 
The DNB supervisory approach has the potential to significantly 
improve the level of self-reflection at the board level of behavioral issues, 
including in relation to constructive challenge and addressing risks of 
groupthink, to lead to improvements in the industry. The DNB has a highly 
experienced team of experts in organizational behavior, which assesses 
firms’ organizational behaviors—including by way of attending board 
meetings—and makes suggestions, if appropriate, to firms for 
improvement.140 
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The DNB approach is highly significant and influential, in terms of 
providing the expertise and constructive challenge to firms regarding the 
behaviors that is expected of firms, including board members.141 
Nevertheless, the DNB has some potential limitations in terms of 
achieving the desired outcome of improved behaviour and culture: 
 It is a “top-down” regulatory approach that has the potential to 
give rise to moral licensing (all behaviors that are not specifically 
criticized by the regulator may be considered by the firm to be 
perfectly acceptable). Some firms and board members might also 
take a minimalist regulatory compliance-based approach and not 
look beyond what they may deem to be regulatory “impositions” 
in terms of standards of behavior to be adopted by them. In other 
words, the DNB methodology might possibly “have the 
unintended effect of crowding out firms’ intrinsic motivations to 
think seriously about cultural risks.”142 
 The approach depends, to an important extent, on sufficient 
mutual trust between the regulator and the senior individuals in 
the firm so that open conversations can be had between them to 
enable a fuller mutual understanding of behaviors and culture, on 
the basis of which constructive engagement on potential changes 
can be held. If senior individuals in the firm are concerned, 
however, the information or views that they provide to their 
regulator may subsequently be used by the regulator against 
them or colleagues (for example, in the context of a fitness and 
probity review of an individual) or in a formal sanctions 
proceeding against the firm, it may be very difficult to establish 
the necessary level of mutual trust to achieve sufficiently 
meaningful reforms.143 
E. Industry Initiative Risks? 
There is, of course, the risk that industry initiatives may be more 
inclined to serve the interests of industry firms rather than consumers. As 
Adam Smith famously stated, “People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”144 
Such a risk is significantly mitigated, in the case of the Irish Banking 
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Culture Board, by virtue of the fact that the board of this organization is 
chaired by a former Court of Appeal judge, and a majority of the board is 
composed of individuals who are not from the banking industry (they 
include representatives of consumer groups).145 
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR INDUSTRY-WIDE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE 
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
A. Enhancing the Quality of Data Available to the Board to Enable It  
to More Effectively Assess the Alignment of the Firm’s Behaviors  
with Its Espoused Values 
As noted above, it is important for a board not to have as its sole 
source of information the information provided to it by its senior 
management team. In this regard, as stated in a U.S. report on corporate 
governance, boards should “[e]ncourage direct dialogue with the entire 
organization by having routine contact with employees beyond the senior 
management team.”146 A useful development in this direction is the U.K. 
Banking Standards Board’s (BSB) comprehensive benchmarked annual 
assessment process for all of its member banks and building societies. This 
provides detailed and benchmarked feedback to boards from their staff. 
The high-level results of the first annual assessment were published by the 
BSB in 2016.147 Its third annual assessment was published in April 
2019.148 
The assessment involves an employee survey of over 72,000 
employees regarding firm-specific focus groups with employees, written 
submissions from boards, and interviews with non-executive directors and 
executives.149 The survey results are provided through an online dashboard 
that allows the firm to cut and analyze the data in multiple ways, subject 
always to constraints imposed to protect respondents’ anonymity.150 Such 
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an industry-wide assessment approach is particularly useful for the reasons 
outlined below. 
First, it provides a common language to describe relevant cultural 
factors and metrics for assessing those factors across the industry. This 
makes it easier for boards and other stakeholders to engage in an effective 
discussion of culture within their firm, on the basis of a uniform or 
common language and a set of metrics derived from industry best practice. 
The U.K. Banking Standards Board is clear that it does not seek to 
assess firms against a template of what a “good” culture looks like. Rather, 
it assesses firms against nine identified characteristics: honesty, respect, 
openness, accountability, competence, reliability, responsiveness, 
personal and organisational resilience, and shared purpose. According to 
the Banking Standards Board 
We do not . . . set out to measure or rank culture directly. Rather, we 
ask how far each of our nine characteristics is demonstrated by the 
firm and relative to other firms. We would expect a firm that strongly 
exhibited our nine characteristics to be better equipped and more 
likely to service its customers, members and clients well, than one in 
which these elements were lacking.151 
These nine characteristics are very similar, although not identical, to 
the nine common attributes of a healthy culture, identified in the U.K. 
Financial Reporting Council’s July 2018 non-binding Guidance on Board 
Effectiveness (which accompanies the 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance 
Code).152 
Second, the U.K. Banking Standards Board assessment is in-depth 
and provides a rich source of data, including firm-specific data, that 
enables boards of financial services firms to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the culture of their firm. The assessment methodology 
was, for example, relied on by the Irish Banking Culture Board in its 
survey of its five retail bank members; the survey findings, which were 
published in April 2019, included: (1) only 59% of respondents believed 
that senior leaders in their organization meant what they said;153 (2) 49% 
of respondents stated that they see instances where unethical behavior is 
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rewarded;154 and (3) 47% of respondents believed that if they raised 
concerns about the way they work, they would be worried about the 
negative consequences for them.155 The Banking Standards Board 
provides firm-specific data to the board of each participating firm and 
discusses it with the firm (but publishes only high-level aggregated 
data).156 The Board is clear that participation in the assessment “demands 
a readiness on the part of board members and the executives to be self-
critical and to ask questions of themselves and their employees that may 
elicit unexpected and unwelcome answers.”157 
Third, firms receive benchmarked data, so that they can assess their 
performance in the context of the norms of the wider industry. The relevant 
comparison data “include a range and quartile against the equivalent 
category across all relevant firms.”158 
Fourth, the published results may create a form of peer pressure for 
boards to address any identified issues of concern. 
And fifth, the results also enable the Banking Standards Board to 
carry out further work on industry standards of good practice, where issues 
of concern have been identified. 
B. Better Understanding the Customer Perspective 
In order for a board to properly assess whether its firm’s behaviors 
are aligned with its espoused values, it will also need a data set related to 
the perspective of its customers. This is particularly important given the 
opportunities for financial services firms to take advantage of customers, 
especially retail customers. 
In the first place, such opportunities for taking advantage of 
customers can arise as a result of market power.159 This market power can 
derive particularly in retail markets from, for example, customer inertia 
and their lack of financial literacy. As stated in a recent U.K. Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) retail banking market investigation report 
                                                     
 154. Id. at 35. 
 155. Id. at 20 (responding to the survey question, “[i]f I raised concerns about the way we work, 
I would be worried about the negative consequences for me,” 22% of respondents responded with 
“strongly agreed” and 25% with “somewhat agree”). 
 156. See, e.g., BANKING STANDARDS BD., supra note 137, at 19. 
 157. Id. at 64. 
 158. Id. at 66. 
 159. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER: UNDERSTANDING 
COMPETITION LAW 9 (2004), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system 
/uploads/attachment_data/file/284400/oft415.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN3G-WEXD] (“Market power 
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or quality below competitive levels. An undertaking with market power might also have the ability 
and incentive to harm the process of competition in other ways; for example, by weakening existing 
competition, raising entry barriers or slowing innovation.”). 
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The behaviour of customers can play a central role in providing 
competitive constraints on providers. This happens if customers are 
engaged and willing to search for and implicitly threaten to switch to 
another provider, which offers them a better deal. Conversely, a lack 
of customer engagement in the market reduces banks’ incentives to 
compete.160 
Customer inertia and limited financial literacy appear to be particular 
issues of concern in retail financial services markets. With regard to 
customer inertia, a November 2017 bulletin from the CBI noted that the 
number of bank current accounts held by personal consumers in Ireland in 
the first half of 2017 was just over 5.28 million and that, during this period, 
the number of switches of current accounts from one credit institution to 
another was 2,715—a switching rate of 0.05%.161 This rate of switching is 
considerably lower than the 3% annual rate162 noted by the U.K. 
Competition and Markets Authority for personal consumer accounts in its 
study of the U.K. market—which the CMA considered to be “very low” 
and a factor resulting in the imposition of regulatory remedies on retail 
banks in the U.K. to address competition concerns.163 
As for retail customer financial literacy, as noted by Governor of the 
Central Bank of Ireland, Philip Lane, in a February 2017 speech, “A vast 
empirical literature shows that consumers tend to make poor financial 
choices, taking on too much debt, misunderstanding investment risk and 
choosing financial products that do not match their needs.”164 
Even in competitive markets, customers risk being taken advantage 
of. In the 2015 book by Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert 
Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and 
                                                     
 160. COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, RETAIL BANKING MARKET INVESTIGATION: 
FINAL REPORT, at xvi (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f 
6c00007a/retail-banking-market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9A7-9FNJ]. 
 161. CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, CONSUMER PROTECTION BULLETIN: CURRENT ACCOUNTS AND 
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Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure & Reform, Minister Donohoe Launches Phase 
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Department of Finance is running this campaign as part of a range of competition measures agreed 
with the European Commission to raise awareness and promote customer switching in the retail 
financial product area. This was agreed in the context of the restructuring plans for AIB and PTSB. 
The campaign is being funded entirely by the two banks.”). 
 162. COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, supra note 160, at 155. 
 163. Id. at 423. 
 164. Press Release, Philip R. Lane, Governor, Cent. Bank of Ir., The Role of Financial 
Regulation in Protecting Consumers (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/ 
financial-regulation-protecting-consumers-governor-lane [https://perma.cc/J5AC-MM4F]. 
756 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:723 
Deception, the authors argue that, even in competitive markets, sellers 
systematically exploit our psychological weaknesses and our ignorance 
through manipulation and deception.165 
A recent example of such “phishing” arose in the March 2019 fine 
imposed by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority on The Carphone 
Warehouse for misleading customers in the sale of mobile phone insurance 
products over a seven-year period.166 The firm was fined over £29 million 
for this conduct.167 
In light of these issues, the ongoing work of the U.K. Banking 
Standards Board to develop a Consumer Framework is interesting and 
potentially useful. In November 2017, the Banking Standards Board 
published a consultation document entitled What Do Good Banking 
Outcomes Look Like to Consumers?168 This document sets out outcomes-
focused criteria for assessing what good consumer outcomes look like. The 
criteria they have identified were access, choice, clarity, and transparency, 
safety and security, redress and being listened to, value for money, and 
fairness.169 
The development of these industry-agreed criteria for assessing 
customer outcomes will likely be helpful in providing an industry-agreed 
language for assessing the consumer perspective (i.e., going beyond a 
minimalist approach of focusing on issues such as volume of complaints 
received). More generally, in our view, there may be a benefit in an 
industry approach or benchmarking to develop best practice in the area of 
dealing with customer complaints and to ensure that there is sufficiently 
useful board-level engagement on this issue. This would enable boards to 
assess effectively whether the behaviors of the firm are in line with 
espoused values (and to mitigate against the risk of board “blind spots” in 
relation to this): 
                                                     
 165. See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015). 
 166. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., FCA Fines the Carphone Warehouse Over €29m for 
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CONSUMERS? (2017) [hereinafter BSB, CONSULTATION], https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk 
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 Customer complaints provide a potentially significant 
countervailing influence on firms that will assist boards to 
identify and possibly address issues in which the firm takes 
unfair advantage of its customers (whether intentionally or 
otherwise). As stated by Dr. Ken Henry, Chairman of National 
Australian Bank (and former Australian Treasury Secretary) in 
evidence to the Australian Royal Commission into misconduct 
in the Australian financial services industry: “So how do you 
measure customer outcomes?---Mainly—mainly through 
complaints from customers, to be honest.”170 
 Financial services firms are subject to regulatory requirements in 
relation to complaints management.171 The requirements, 
however, broadly tend to be procedural in nature.172 There would 
be a benefit in industry considering this issue not simply from a 
regulatory or procedural perspective but increasingly from the 
perspective of the board’s role in assessing whether the actual 
practices of their firm diverges from its stated values. 
 Any such articulation of industry best practices and potential 
benchmarking would serve to address the risk of complacency of 
firms regarding the adequacy of their complaint management 
systems by subjecting the systems to constructive peer appraisal; 
in the words of Onora O’Neill, commenting on the role of the 
U.K. Banking Standards Board, “it is like someone else holding 
a mirror at an unfamiliar angle to give a view that in-house 
exercises may not provide.”173 
 As outlined in the Introduction to this article, there is currently a 
major problem of lack of public trust in the financial services 
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 173. Baroness Onora O’Neill, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks by Baroness Onora O’Neill: 
What is Banking For? (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/remarks-by-
baroness-onora-oneill/ [https://perma.cc/78UJ-NBW6]. 
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industry.174 The trustworthiness of the financial services industry 
may improve, and trust in this industry may thereby increase, if 
the industry further improves its standards in relation to the 
handling of customer complaints. 
It may be that customers are more likely to complain to their financial 
institution if they consider that the chances of their complaint being 
effectively considered increase—interestingly, the Australian Royal 
Commission received over 10,000 customer complaints during the course 
of its deliberations.175 This has the benefit for firms of providing useful 
indicators of potential misconduct risk. Indeed, whilst individual customer 
complaints may appear to be relatively trivial to boards, trend data 
including qualitative information on the trends can provide useful 
indicators of potential misconduct risk176 (and would likely have proven 
useful to the boards of Wells Fargo and the U.K. banks dealing with PPI, 
described above, had they paid sufficiently close attention to such 
information that could and should have been available to them). 
B. Effective Constructive Challenge by Boards of Executive Team 
Each individual director on a board is individually responsible for 
engaging in effective constructive challenge of the executive team to 
ensure that the strategy and cultural values set by the board are being 
properly implemented by the executive team. Thus, for example, Article 
91(8) CRD IV states that “[e]ach member of the management body [board] 
shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively 
assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where 
necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decision-
making.”177 With regard to the criterion of “independence of mind,” the 
joint European Securities and Markets Authority/European Banking 
Authority Guidelines provide that, when assessing an individual’s 
“independence of mind,” the assessing regulator should consider whether 
the individual has “the necessary behavioural skills, including: i. courage, 
conviction and strength to effectively assess and challenge the proposed 
decisions of other members of the management body; ii. being able to ask 
                                                     
 174. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, for example, has stated that “the incidence 
of financial sector misconduct has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic risks by 
undermining trust in both financial institutions and markets.” Carney, supra note 2, at 7. 
 175. ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at xxxv. 
 176. See, e.g., CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, supra note 171, at 68 (“A regulated entity must 
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including investigating whether complaints indicate an isolated issue or a more widespread issue for 
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 177. Council Directive 2013/36, art. 91, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 386 (EU). 
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questions to the members of the management body in its management 
function; and iii. being able to resist ‘group-think.’”178 Apart from this 
individual assessment in the context of a fitness and probity application 
process, boards are also required to carry out regular reviews of their 
effectiveness.179 
These review processes, together with ongoing supervision, provide 
regulators with some insights into the effectiveness of boards and 
individual members of boards. There is a limit, however, to how useful an 
insight can be when gained from process-driven regulatory engagements 
(e.g., reviews of board minutes that can often be relatively short and 
focused on decisions taken rather than the nature and extent of discussion 
at the board meeting, are unlikely to give particularly useful insights into 
the dynamics of board meetings and the effectiveness of board-level 
challenges of the executive team). 
Accordingly, as outlined above, we consider that there is merit in 
industry initiatives to identify, “normalize,” and potentially benchmark 
best practice in relation to how board members can best engage in 
constructive challenge whilst maintaining the effectiveness of the board as 
a whole. 
Given that groupthink has been identified as an issue of concern by 
regulators—according to Andrew Haldane, The Bank of England’s Chief 
Economist, “groupthink was the reason most banks (as well as many 
regulators, central banks and academics) failed in 2008”180—an industry 
culture and standards body could, using inter-disciplinary approaches, 
usefully identify international best practice, to address this problem and 
the issue of effective constructive challenge at the board level. 
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In this regard, it is interesting to note that the U.K. Banking Standards 
Board has created a new unit, called “BSB Insights,” that will draw on 
insights from behavioral economics and organizational psychology to 
identify cultural or behavioral factors that enable, promote, or inhibit high 
standards in banking, understand their causes, and help to test the 
effectiveness of interventions.181 
Any such guidance on best practice could also look at the related core 
behavioral problem of a lack of speaking up within financial services firms 
and the approach of the board and board members to addressing this. 
Whilst boards may well have approved and appropriate processes and 
procedures in place to enable and facilitate speaking up, this is of limited 
use if, in practice, there is a culture that does not encourage speaking up. 
As noted by the U.K. Banking Standards Board, 
Encouraging people to speak out and challenge—something that is 
central to a good risk culture—requires effort on the part of those 
leading an organisation to address all of the many factors that will 
reinforce conformity; to make, in other words, challenge and 
continuous improvement so acceptable that they become the norm. 
This requires not just talking about what’s expected, but acting it out: 
demonstrating constructive challenge, for example; inviting and 
visibly responding to feedback; or sharing personal examples about 
speaking out, being challenged or making and learning from 
mistakes. 
To have credibility and carry weight, especially on an issue as 
difficult as speaking up, leaders need not just to tell stories about what 
is expected; they need to be in the stories that other people are telling. 
One interesting aspect of the assessment focus group discussions, in 
this context, is the extent to which participants talking about values 
or behaviours refer to the example set by their leaders or managers, 
or whether the latter are notable by their absence.182 
C. Clarifying the Purpose of the Firm 
The role of a corporation in society is becoming a topic of increasing 
public discussion.183 A bank’s role in wider society and its “social license 
to operate”184 is also an issue of concern to financial services regulators 
globally. As stated in a 2015 speech by a Vice President of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
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Banks receive operating benefits unavailable to other industries 
because they provide important services to the public. For example, 
financial intermediation is enhanced through deposit insurance and 
access to the discount window. Public benefits, though, are not a 
gift. They are part of a quid pro quo. In exchange for receiving 
valuable operating benefits, a bank’s implicit codes of conduct—that 
is, its culture—must reflect the public dimension of the services that 
banks provide.185 
Furthermore, in October 2018, commenting on the proposed new 
legislation to introduce a U.K.-style individual accountability regime in 
Ireland, Minister for Finance Paschal Donohoe stated that “[his] objective 
in legislating for expanded Central Bank powers, is to cultivate a 
sustainable financial services industry, with rewards reaped over the long-
term for customers, staff, and shareholders, and where consideration of the 
impact on individuals, the economy and society as a whole is firmly 
embedded in organisational culture.”186 Notably, in the U.K., the 2018 
revised U.K. Corporate Governance Code 2018 provides, as one of its core 
principles, that the role of the board of a company is to “promote the long-
term sustainable success of the company, generating value for 
shareholders and contributing to wider society.”187 This goes beyond the 
shareholder-value focus of companies in recent decades. Also, in 
Australia, a proposed revised edition of the Australian Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations proposes to introduce a new 
principle regarding listed entities’ social license to operate. “A listed entity 
should instill and continually reinforce a culture across the organisation of 
acting lawfully, ethically and in a socially responsible manner.”188 Further, 
in the U.S., Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed a legislative bill that 
would require certain-sized U.S. corporations to take account of a range 
of stakeholders, going beyond shareholders.189 
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Interestingly, in the U.K., the British Academy is currently engaged 
in a major research project on the future of the corporation.190 The program 
aims to “contribute to . . . [redefining] business [in] the 21st century and 
build[ing] trust between business and society.”191 In December 2018, the 
Academy published its initial research conclusions,192 pointing to the need 
to develop a new framework for the corporation around three 
interconnected principles: (1) well-defined and aligned purposes, (2) a 
commitment to trustworthiness, and (3) embedding an enabling culture. 
Also, according to the initial research conclusions, this shift would require 
co-ordinated action on a new approach to the use of five identified levers, 
relating to: ownership, corporate governance, regulation, taxation, and 
investment.193 
The next phase of this major research project is continuing in 2019, 
looking at precise business practice and policy implications of the 
proposed framework; in particular, it will consider the laws and regulation, 
ownership and governance, and measurement and management required 
by the proposed new framework.194 
As to the issue of a proposed shift from the current “shareholder 
value” paradigm of corporations to a future paradigm in which 
corporations take greater account of a wider social purpose, the research 
paper notes the development of the Friedman Doctrine, essentially 
equating corporate purpose with shareholder profits. While this doctrine 
may have addressed the problem of the lack of sufficient accountability of 
managers of a firm: 
It is at this point that our research suggests the nature of the 
corporation erred. While it was right to be concerned about the lack 
of accountability of management, it was wrong to see its resolution 
in control by one party to the firm. The reason why this happened was 
that the rights of shareholders were equated with the property rights 
of owners. Shareholders bore the risks and rewards of the success and 
failure of business and so had corresponding rights to control it. 
But shareholders are not in many cases owners in any meaningful 
sense of the word and do not aspire to act as owners. This 
misconception and preoccupation with one single party to the firm 
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rather than a wider constituency has been the cause of mounting 
environmental concerns, social tensions and political backlash. 
These have become particularly acute since the 2007–8 Financial 
Crisis, as many of the defects of the conventional wisdom were laid 
bare.195 
In our view, addressing this issue of corporate purpose will be a key 
element in improving trust in the financial services industry over time. For 
many consumers, their distrust of the financial services industry derives to 
a significant extent from evidence that this industry has focused on short-
term profit maximizing at the expense of consumer interest. This consumer 
perception appears to us to derive, at least in part, from a view that the 
“mindset” of those in the financial services industry is based on the above 
Friedman Doctrine, which, in extremis, suggests that firms can go to any 
lengths to profit maximize, unless specifically prohibited by law or the 
regulator—i.e., consumers cannot rely on financial firms to look after their 
interests, unless specifically required to do so by law or the regulator, and, 
even then, any reliance placed by customers on financial institutions 
complying with the law can be misplaced.196 
This problem is compounded by a range of issues that arise in the 
financial services industry, described earlier in this paper, including: (1) 
information asymmetries between the financial services provider and the 
customer (reinforced by generally low levels of financial literacy of retail 
consumers); (2) conflicts of interest in financial services firms; (3) market 
power of firms, particularly arising from lack of customer 
engagement/willingness to switch provider; and (4) the relatively high 
rewards for the staff of financial services firms in successfully contributing 
to short-term profits of the firm, sometimes with little, if any, downside 
for doing so at the expense of the customer interest (other than compliance 
with clear minimum legal requirements). 
As outlined above, in accordance with the framework for assessing 
culture set out by Edgar Schein, where the culture of a firm involves 
widespread discrepancies between desired behaviors and observed 
behaviors, as is the case in the financial services industry, leaders need to 
“locate the cultural DNA and change some of that”197 or, in other words, 
address culture issues at the level of taken-for-granted underlying basic 
assumptions and not merely at the level of artifacts or espoused values and 
beliefs. 
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It is our view, therefore, that a key to improving culture in the 
financial services industry in the longer term will be addressing the need 
to tackle the “Friedman Doctrine” mindset in the industry (and in 
corporations more widely) and recognizing the need for firms’ purposes 
to encompass wider purposes than “shareholder value.” 
There is a limited amount that firms can do individually to address 
this industry-wide mindset issue, given, for example, the coordination 
failures problem identified by the New York Federal Reserve as discussed 
above. 
Accordingly, bodies such as the U.K. Banking Standards Board and 
Irish Banking Culture Board would be particularly well-placed to build on 
the above-described on-going work of the British Academy to consider 
how financial services firms can embed a “mindset” regarding the purpose 
of the firm that takes sufficient account of the interests of a wider range of 
stakeholders than merely those of shareholders. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Boards of financial services firms have a clear and critical role in 
establishing the values of the firm and monitoring whether the behaviors 
of the firm are aligned with these values. 
Quite apart from ensuring that appropriate structures and governance 
are in place, increasingly more is expected of boards in terms of ensuring 
that they (1) have available to them the best and most reliable information 
in order to enable them to perform this function effectively—and to 
proactively seek out further information and explanations where there are 
indications available to the board that actual behaviors within the firm do 
not align with stated values; and (2) constructively challenge executive 
management. 
In our view, given that, as noted above by the DNB, “in essence, peer 
pressure regulates behaviour,”198 there is merit in improving the standard 
of board performance in these particular areas on the basis of industry-
wide initiatives, as suggested in this Article. Any such initiatives would, 
of course, be in addition to minimum standards of behavior as established 
by law and regulatory requirements and expectations. 
Furthermore, there is also merit, for the same reasons in our view, in 
industry-wide engagement in the evolving public debate, to address the 
issue of the mindset within the industry, which is arguably based on the 
shareholder value, or Friedman Doctrine, and if and how this can evolve 
into a wider conception of the purpose of a financial services organization 
in society. 
                                                     
 198. SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 50. 
